This hypothesis was supported by two outcomes of formal logic: ..

Example:

And Kuhn's hypothesis of paradigm shifts is ..

Although they sometimes offer good reasons for doubting whether individual citizens are generally obliged to obey the state, anarchists naturally tend not to develop clear conceptions of how a stateless society might function.

As an example of such an investigation, amonograph entitled  (1957),by G.E.M.

Willard Van Orman Quine home page by Douglas Boynton Quine

For if the theory is correct, no suchexperimental situation will be an instance of seeing; and if it is wrong,merely describing a hypothetical situation would suffice.

His publications include collaboration with Quine on  and with Nelson Goodman on several articles.

One reservation many have hadabout Quine's argument is about how to explain the appearance ofthe analytic. Most people, for example, would distinguish ouroriginal two sets of sentences (§1), by saying thatsentences of the second set, such as “All ophthalmologists areeye doctors,” could be known to be true just by knowing themeanings of the constituent words. Moreover, they might agreeabout an indefinite number of further examples, e.g., thatpediatricians are doctors for children, grandfathers are parents ofparents, that sauntering is a kind of movement, pain a mental state, andfood, stuff that people eat. As Grice and Strawson (1956) andPutnam (1962) stressed, it's implausible to suppose thatthere's nothing people are getting at in thesejudgments.

Two other people were seeking the same answer through Google more than a year ago.


Meaningful words without sense, & other revolutions - …

Bealer (1987, 1999) defends similar proposals. NeitherBonjour nor Bealer are in fact particularly concerned to defend theanalytic by such claims, but their recourse to mere understanding ofpropositional content is certainly what many defenders of the analytichave had in mind. Katz (1998:pp44-5), for example, madethe very same appeal to intuitions explicitly on behalf of the analyticclaims supported by his semantic theory (although he could also beinterpreted as sometimes having adopted the more sophisticated strategyof §4.3 below). Somewhat more modestly, Peacocke (1992,2005) claims that possession of certain logical concepts requires thata person find certain inferences “primitively compelling,” orcompelling not by reason of some inference or in any way that takes“their correctness…as answerable to anything else” (p. 6).In a similar vein, Boghossian (1997) appeals to rationalinferential practices that might implicitly define at least the logicalconnectives (see Harman 1996 and Horwich 2000 for discussion).

Behaviorism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Just as he challenged the dominant analytic–synthetic distinction, Quine also took aim at traditional . According to Quine, traditional epistemology tried to justify the sciences, but this effort (as exemplified by ) failed, and so we should replace traditional epistemology with an empirical study of what sensory inputs produce what theoretical outputs.: "Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input — certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance — and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology: namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence...But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology." (Quine, 1969: 82–3)

Logical Positivism (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The disposition toward empiricalscience, with observation as its foundation, united with the observation thatthe evidence men have of what goes on in the mental lives of other people mustcome from what they see of their , has oftenwarred against the other inclination of Empiricism to regard the starting pointof all knowledge of the world, for each person, as being essentially privatesense experience.