How does Descartes' "Evil Demon" hypothesis lead …

01/01/1997 · That Descartes uses the deceiver hypothesis in this way to ..
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These are subject to the Evil Deceiver hypothesis

The most famous rendering of Descartes' most hyperbolic doubt takesthe form of the Evil Genius Doubt. Suppose I am the creation of apowerful but malicious being. This “evil genius” (ordeceiving “God, or whatever I may call him,” AT 7:24)has given me flawed cognitive faculties, such that I am in error evenabout epistemically impressive matters — even the simple mattersthat seem supremely evident. The suggestion is perhaps unbelievable, butnot unthinkable. It is intended as a justification-defeating doubt thatundermines our judgments about even the most simple and evidentmatters.

Descartes makes the improbable hypothesis of "an evil ..
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In order to disprove the evil demon hypothesis, Descartes ..

In reply to Arnauld, Descartes claims that he avoided this problemby distinguishing between present clear and distinct perceptions andthose that are merely remembered (7:246). He is not here challengingthe reliability of memory (Frankfurt 1962). Rather, hisstrategy is to suggest that the hypothesis of a deceiving God can onlypresent itself when we are not clearly and distinctly perceiving theinfinity and perfection of God, because when we are doing that wecannot help but believe that God is no deceiver. It is as if this veryevident perception is then to be balanced with the uncertain opinionthat God might be a deceiver (7:144). The evident perception wins outand the doubt is removed.

Descartes justifies this uncertainty with his evil genius hypothesis; ..
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What next? How does Descartes think we're to make epistemic progressif even our epistemic best is subject to hyperbolic doubt?This juncture of the Third Meditation (the end of the fourth paragraph)marks the beginning point of Descartes' notorious efforts to refute theEvil Genius Doubt. His efforts involve an attempt to establish that weare the creatures not of an evil genius, but an all-perfect creator whowould not allow us to be deceived about what we clearly and distinctlyperceive. Before turning our attention (in )to these efforts, let's digress somewhat to consider a Cartesian doctrinethat has received much attention in its subsequent history.

10/12/2007 · How does Descartes' "Evil Demon" hypothesis lead directly to an ..
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Descartes' Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of …

In what follows I have reconstructed the main line of Descartes' overall argument in the so as to highlight the pervasive role played by the hypothesis of Evil Genius in first its strong, then in its weakened form.

from the “utmost power” attributed to the deceiver

Building on these texts, assume that Descartes holds that theneeded conclusion comes to be self-evident — namely, theconclusion that an all-perfect God exists who guarantees the C&DRule. Assume, indeed, that this truth comes to have a kind ofcogito-like status, in the following sense: whenever I try todoubt whether God exists, or is a deceiver, or the like, the effort atdoubt ends up being self-stultifying. When I try to doubt myown existence, I immediately apprehend that I must exist inorder to be attempting the doubt. Similarly (on this interpretation),when I try to doubt God's existence, or omnipotence, orbenevolence — or any other attribute contained in the veryconception of an all-perfect being — I immediately apprehend,as Descartes writes, that any such sceptical conception of God“implies a conceptual contradiction — that is, it cannotbe conceived” (1643 letter to Voetius, AT 8b:60). In that case,the hard problem for an unbounded doubt interpretation has dissolved. Ican no longer doubt the Arc 1 conclusions about God, or the Arc 2conclusions about the divine guarantee, because those conclusions havebecome self-evident: to try to doubt them is to think about them; butto think about them is to apprehend their truth. The mechanism fordoubting inferential truths — that of attending to a conclusionwithout also attending to the premises on which it rests — isnow impotent. No longer resting on premises, those truthsare self-evidently recognized as true whenever I attend to them. Thisinterpretation explains why Descartes holds, in the final analysis,that the Evil Genius Doubt eventually loses it undermining potency.